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In a world dominated by the emergence of global value chains, production processes increasingly fragment 
across a variety of countries. We provide new macro-economic evidence on this phenomenon, using a 
Theil-type distribution index of value added, which we call the international production fragmentation (IPF) 
index. In contrast to the well-known Feenstra and Hanson (1999) measure, this novel index does not suffer 
from a country size-bias and double counting due to re-imported intermediates. Moreover, it is sensitive to 
changes in the country-distribution of value added. We identify global value chains (GVCs) by the country-
industry in which the last stage of production takes place. Using a new dataset of world input-output tables 
covering 40 countries, we find that since 1995 production processes for most manufacturing goods in 
Europe increasingly fragmented across countries, although at different paces. In 2008, GVCs of electrical 
products and transportation equipment were generally most internationally fragmented, while food 
products and minerals production the least. Averaged across products, Belgium, Ireland and the 
Netherlands had the most fragmented GVCs in 2008, followed by Germany, the Czech Republic, and 
Hungary, where fragmentation increased at a high pace since 1995. We also find that in 1995, European 
value chains were mainly fragmented across other EU countries. Afterwards, however, there has been a 
strong trend towards increased participation of non-European countries. The financial crisis in 2008 led only 
to a temporary reduction in international production fragmentation.  
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In 2006, Hans-Werner Sinn labeled Germany a “Bazaar Economy” (Sinn, 2006). He argued that national 
institutional arrangements led to wages becoming so high as compared to other countries that Germany 
had specialized in capital-intensive activities, while labor-intensive activities had been offshored. While 
German exports were booming, the domestic value added declined, leading to sluggish economic growth 
and high unemployment. For illustration, Sinn referred to a study estimating that only 33 per cent of the 
value of a Porsche luxury car was added on German soil (Dudenhöffer, 2005). German firms like Porsche 
relocated substantial parts of their production processes to cheaper foreign locations, enabled by 
reductions in the costs of transportation and fast progress in information and communication technology 
(Baldwin, 2006a). Case studies like this and others (such as in Dedrick et al., 2010, on high-tech electronics) 
have been the inspiration of much of the burgeoning literature on the causes and consequences of 
international fragmentation of production.1 This literature covers a wide set of perspectives, ranging from 
international business scholars who studied issues of governance in global value chains (Sturgeon et al., 
2008), development economists and sociologists who focused on ways in which backward countries and 
regions could use global value chains to foster development (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002; Gereffi et al., 
2005), to trade economists who focused on the extent to which these tendencies affect international trade 
patterns at a more macroeconomic level, both empirically (Feenstra and Hanson, 1999; Koopman et al., 
2012; Johnson and Noguera, 2012a,b) and theoretically (e.g., Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; Costinot 
et al., 2013).  
Empirical work that actually measures the degree of international fragmentation of production is 
however, limited. This paper aims to contribute by generalizing the type of results obtained in the case 
study approach towards macro-economic insights. We propose a new index of international production 
fragmentation, named the IPF index, which builds upon the broad offshoring measure proposed by Feenstra 
and Hanson (1999). This measure was simply defined as the share of imports in the intermediate inputs 
used in production of a good. While straightforward and simple to calculate, this measure suffers from a 
number of shortcomings if used as an indicator of international production fragmentation. First, it suffers 
from a country-size bias as larger countries can source from a wider variety of domestic input producers 
than smaller countries and hence will have lower import shares. Importantly, it includes just the total value 
of imports irrespective of the country of origin. Sourcing a similar value of imports but from a wider set of 
countries should have an impact on a meaningful fragmentation measure. In addition, the Feenstra and 
Hanson measure disregards the fact that imports are often themselves part of an international production 
process that might involve multiple countries, including the country under consideration. With increasing 
back and forth trade across borders, double-counting of imports will occur.2 
Our index of international production fragmentation is more general than the Feenstra-Hanson 
measure and does not suffer from these shortcomings. It is based on an entropy index that measures the 
distance between the actual cross-country distribution of value directly and indirectly added in the 
production of a particular good and the cross-country distribution of world GDP. According to this measure, 
fragmentation will be low if most value is added in the economy that also sells the product to the final user. 
                                                          
1
 This term was introduced by Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) and will be used in this paper to denote the phenomenon 
in which production processes are increasingly fragmented in separate activities that are carried out in several 
countries. 
2
 These double-counting issues are highlighted in the work of Koopman et al. (2013). 
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If, however, materials, parts and components are increasingly imported and sourced from an increasing 
number of countries, fragmentation as measured by the IPF index will increase. The IPF index does not 
suffer from a country-size bias and it takes into account the full distribution of value added in all stages of 
production. It is related to the work by Dietzenbacher and Romero (2007), Fally (2011) and Antras et al. 
(2012) who focus on physical aspects of production processes by computing the average number of 
transactions a given product will go through before being sold for final use. If this number of transactions 
goes up, they consider production processes to have become more fragmented. Instead of measuring 
numbers of transactions, our measure will focus on the distribution of value added in the chain. 
We use the IPF index to address three basic questions on the fragmentation processes of global values 
chains for European products. First, how fast was the international fragmentation process of European 
value chains since 1995, both across countries and products? Second, are these trends mainly due to 
increasing fragmentation within the EU27, or due to increased sourcing from non-EU27 countries? And 
third, did the global financial crisis that started in 2008 cause a structural change in the pace of increasing 
production fragmentation (see, e.g. Bems et al., 2011, for an account of the trade collapse immediately 
following the crisis)?   
To implement the IPF index empirically, it is crucial to define and identify the set of value adding 
activities that constitutes the production process of a particular good. In case studies this is done by 
assessing the values and production locations of all components and services that go into a narrowly 
defined good, such as an iPod produced in China (Linden et al., 2011).3 In order to provide a comprehensive 
macro-economic overview instead, we have to work at a more aggregate level and focus on sets of narrow 
classes of final products. These will be identified by the industry and country in which the last production 
stage takes place (such as the transport equipment manufacturing industry in Germany), before the good is 
delivered to the final consumer. We will label the industry in which the last stage of production takes place 
the “country-industry-of-completion”. The computation of the value added in the production in each of the 
intermediate inputs of first-tier suppliers and suppliers further upstream requires international input-
output tables that cover the world economy. We use the new World Input-Output Database (see Timmer, 
ed., 2012; Dietzenbacher et al., 2013b) for the years 1995-2009 and projections based on this database for 
2010 and 2011.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our IPF index and compare it to 
the Feenstra-Hanson index, and show how it can be decomposed to provide relevant additional information 
about the drivers of changes in international production fragmentation. Section 3 gives a brief description 
of the data used. In Section 4, trends in IPF indices, various decompositions and a regression analysis will be 




                                                          
3
 Linden et al. (2011) found that about 70% of all wage income related to the production of an iPod in 2006 was earned 
on U.S. soil, while workers in China earned only 2%, despite the product being labeled as “Made in China”. They also 
found that workers in Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan earned substantial shares of the iPod’s global value chain 
wage income, which illustrates the geographical dispersion of income related to the iPod’s production chain. 
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2. AN INDEX OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION FRAGMENTATION (IPF) 
 
How can international production fragmentation be measured in a macroeconomic setting? The study by 
Feenstra and Hanson (1999) was one of the first to introduce a measure of fragmentation at the industry 
level. Their aim was to indicate the extent of offshoring of activities by US firms in particular. They proposed 
two indicators of what they labeled “international outsourcing”: a narrow and a broad one. Their “broad” 
measure is defined as the share of imported intermediate inputs in the value of all intermediate inputs used 
in a particular industry. In computing their “narrow” measure, they take the import share in the value of 
intermediate inputs from all foreign and domestic industries in the same 2-digit SIC as the industry 
considered.4 These shares basically measure the degree of offshoring of intermediate input production, but 
are often also interpreted as measures of international fragmentation. But while straightforward and simple 
to calculate, these indicators suffer from a number of shortcomings from the latter perspective. First, the 
Feenstra and Hanson (FH) measures suffer from country-size bias invalidating comparisons across countries. 
Large countries typically have lower import shares than small countries as a wider variety of inputs is 
domestically available, and this should be corrected for. Second, FH only measure the total value of imports 
irrespective of the country of origin. Sourcing a similar value of imports but from a wider set of countries 
should have an impact on the fragmentation measure. In addition, their measure disregards the fact that 
the production of imported intermediates in turn requires intermediates that might involve production in 
multiple countries, including the country under consideration. With increasing back and forth trade across 
borders, double-counting of imports will occur. Our index of international production fragmentation is more 
general than the FH measure and does not suffer from these shortcomings. 
We propose an index that uses information from global input-output tables to describe the 
international fragmentation of production in specific value chains. It does not only take the value added 
generated by the immediate suppliers of materials, parts and components to the manufacturer of the final 
good into account, but also valued added by second-tier suppliers and suppliers even further upstream. We 
label our indicator the IPF (international production fragmentation) index.5 
As the point of departure, we take the global value chain (GVC) income perspective on international 
production networks, as introduced by Los et al. (2012) and Timmer et al. (2012). This perspective defines 
the global value chain of a specific industry i located in a specific country j as the activities in industries 
s=1,…,S in each of the countries n=1,…,N required to produce the final output of industry i in country j. Final 
output is output delivered for household consumption and investment demand. We will label (i,j) the 
“country-industry-of-completion”. Industries that create margins between basic prices and purchasers’ 
prices (such as industries producing wholesale and retail services, and transport services industries) are not 
considered as industries-of-completion. An example of a GVC is the GVC for German transport equipment. 
This GVC contains all the activities (ranging from mining activities to basic metals production to the delivery 
of business services and transport equipment manufacturing itself) required to meet final demand for 
transport equipment completed in Germany. These activities can be located in each of the countries, 
                                                          
4
 Imports of steel by German car manufacturers are considered as a form of international outsourcing in Feenstra and 
Hanson’s (1999) broad measure, but are not seen as such in their narrow measure. 
5
 In refining the approach pioneered by Hummels et al. (2001), Koopman et al. (2013) and Johnson and Noguera 
(2012a,b) also used global input-output tables. Their analyses yield measures of vertical specialization, which focus on 
the role a country plays in international networks of global value chains. The IPF index has a global value chain as the 
unit of analysis instead, and aims at measuring its fragmentation. 
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including Germany itself. To measure this, we need to start with finding the levels of gross output 
associated with these activities. This can be estimated by applying standard input-output methods (see 
Miller and Blair, 2009) to global input-output tables. 
Global input-output tables contain information on the values of intermediate input flows among all 
country-industries in the world, as well as on the values of flows from each of these country-industries to 
final use in each of the countries. These tables also contain information on value added generated in each 
of the country-industries. Combining information on values of sales and value added per dollar of sales 
leads to estimates of value added in each of the SN industries as a consequence of final demand of the 
products of industry-of-completion i in country j. If we aggregate these value added figures over industries-
of-completion within each country, we obtain the Global Value Chain Income (GVCI) of each of the N 
countries for the global value chain considered. 
 
***INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
The details regarding the computation of GVCI can be elucidated by referring to Figure 1, which is an 
extension of a diagram in Hummels et al. (2001). It refers to a simplified world economy consisting of three 
countries and depicts a set of global value chains for which country 3 is the country-of-completion. To 
complete its final products (which are sold domestically and exported), it uses domestic capital and labor, 
which generate value added and hence income. Next to these production factors, it uses intermediate 
inputs. Some of these intermediate inputs are produced within country 3 itself, which implies that 
additional value added is generated domestically. Other intermediate inputs are imported from country 2. 
To produce these, country 2 in its turn adds value in its own industries. This value added generation does 
not remain limited to the industries producing the exported intermediate products (the first-tier suppliers 
of country 3’s producers of final products), but value added will also be generated in industries in country 2 
that act as second-tier suppliers to country 3 by producing materials and components that are essential for 
the production by country 2’s first-tier exporters. Finally, second-tier suppliers of the final products of 
manufacturing industries in country 3 are not only located in country 2, but also in country 1. Because the 
production of these second-tier suppliers involves domestic labor and capital, country 1 also adds value in 
the GVCs with country 3 as the country-of-completion. 
A global input-output table can be seen as a description of the worldwide network of internationally 
fragmented production processes, which are much more complicated than depicted in Figure 1. We can 
derive GVCI from such tables, using an equation that has been a standard tool in input-output analysis for 
over decades (see Miller and Blair, 2009): 
 
g = (I -A)-1(e)                   (1) 
 
In this equation, g is the vector of value added created in each of the SN country-industries within a global 
value chain. The choice for a specific final demand matrix  determines which value chain(s) is considered. e 
is a summation vector. (I-A)-1 is the well-known Leontief inverse, the use of which ensures that value added 
contributions in all tiers of suppliers are taken into account. v is a vector with value added over gross output 
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ratios, for each of the country-industries.6 Appendix 1 contains a technical discussion of the derivation of 
Equation (1). To arrive at what we label a “country’s GVCI” below, we first aggregate over the elements of g 
corresponding to the industries within that country. Shares in GVCI are then obtained by dividing the 
country’s GVCI by GVCI summed over all countries. Note that all final demand is considered, irrespective of 
the location of the customers, so including both domestic and foreign demand. 
As an illustration, Table 1 shows the shares of all value added generated within the global value chain 
with the German transport equipment industry as country-industry-of-completion, in 1995 and 2008, 
respectively. As stated above, we refer to these as shares in Global Value Chain Income (GVCI), following 
Timmer et al. (2012). For reasons of exposition, we aggregated over countries to arrive at GVCIs for three 
“regions”.7 The table indicates that Germany itself lost a considerable share of GVCI, while “Other EU27” 
and “Non-EU27” enjoyed growing shares. Intuitively, these results suggest that the production process of 
German transport equipment has become more internationally fragmented in the period 1995-2008. 
 
***INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
The construction of a suitable index of international production fragmentation requires the determination 
of a distribution of GVCI that can be seen as “maximal” or “perfect” fragmentation. If most value added in 
the GVC for German transport equipment would have been generated in Germany itself, international 
fragmentation would be low. In our approach, international production fragmentation is similarly low if 
most value was added by activities in the Slovak Republic, and only marginally in Germany. This suggests 
that “excessive” value added shares in both the country-of-completion and other countries should yield 
index values pointing towards imperfect fragmentation. A question that follows immediately is how to 
define “excessiveness”. In view of the differences in size of the German and Slovakian economies, a GVCI 
share of 60% for Slovakia should be considered as much more excessive than an identical share for 
Germany. We might thus view international production fragmentation as the extent to which GVCI shares 
deviate from the relative sizes of economies. In a situation of perfect fragmentation, all countries 
contribute an amount of value added to each of the GVCs that is proportional to their GDP, irrespective of 
the country-of-completion. In such a case, the share of Germany in an American GVC should be the same as 
in a German GVC. Comparison of the GVCI-shares and GDP-shares of the three regions in Table 1 shows that 
GVC-shares in the German transport equipment manufacturing GVC converged towards GDP-shares, over 
the period 1995-2008. In 2008, the “other EU27” region had a GVC-share that matched its GDP-share, but 
Germany’s share in this GVC is still considerably higher than its GDP share. The mirror image applies to 
“non-EU27”, which is still underrepresented in this global value chain. This is not surprising given the well-
known home-bias in trade. Due to historical path-dependency and remaining barriers to trade, the country 
of completion still has a major share in its “own” GVCs’ incomes.   
This definition of perfect fragmentation suggests that we should adopt an index that aggregates 
differences between the country distributions of GVCI in a particular value chain and world GDP. This 
context therefore calls for a cross entropy approach, in a similar vein as studies of income inequality use 
cross entropy indicators to aggregate deviations in income shares of population subgroups from the shares 
                                                          
6
 Matrices are indicated by bold capital symbols and (column) vectors by bold lowercases. Primes indicate 
transposition and hats denote diagonal matrices with the corresponding vector on the main diagonal. 
7
 The results are based on the World Input-Output Database. See Section 3 for a brief description, or Timmer (ed., 
2012) and Dietzenbacher et al. (2013b) for extensive account of sources and methods. 
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that these subgroups have in the overall population. The two most popular indexes in inequality research 
within the class of generalized entropy statistics are the regular Theil index and the related “Mean Log 
Deviation” (MLD) index, both introduced in Theil (1967).8 The difference between the two indexes relates to 
the weighting of the ratios between the shares implied by both distributions when aggregating these into a 
single figure. In the regular Theil index, the logs of these ratios are weighted by the income shares, while 
the logs of the ratios are weighted by the population shares in the MLD index. As such the regular Theil 
index is relatively sensitive to income changes in the richer parts of the population, while the MLD is more 
sensitive to income changes in larger population subgroups. Translating these differences to the context of 
the present study, the regular Theil would be dominated by countries with a large GVCI share (often the 
country-of-completion, like in Table 1’s illustration), while the MLD index would be affected more by 
countries with a high GDP. The latter is more attractive for our purposes, since the fragmentation index will 
be much less sensitive to the size of the country-of-completion. Hence, we define the IPF-index as      
 
	 
 ∑   ln   ⁄  !
"#$%            (2) 
 
As stated before, i and j together denote the country-industry-of-completion, so IPFij stands for the 
international production fragmentation of the global value chain of which industry i in country j delivers the 
final product. Applying Equation (2) to the GVCI-shares and GDP-shares in Table 1 yields IPF indexes of 1.48 
and 1.10 for 1995 and 2008 respectively, revealing increased international production fragmentation of the 
GVC for German transport equipment. 
The choice to adopt an index that is grounded in entropy statistics has the advantage that we can use 
the decomposability of the index into between-set and within-set inequality stressed by Theil (1967) 
already. In the context of the present analysis, we would like to know more about the geographic scope of 
fragmentation. Is fragmentation of European value chains mainly due to increasing contributions of value 
from an increasing number of faraway countries? Or are such decreases in IPF the consequence of other 
countries in Europe capturing value added that was previously earned in the country-of-completion itself? 
We will refer to the first tendency as “global fragmentation” and to the latter as “regional fragmentation”. 
As is shown in Appendix 2, the total IPF index can be decomposed into four components, according to 
Equation (3).     
 
	 
 &	 ' (&	 ' )*	 ' )+	        (3) 
 
The components of the decomposition are weighted IPFs themselves. Figure 2 graphically shows to which 
distributions of GVCI and GDP the four terms in Equation (3) refer. IPFGF focuses on global fragmentation 
and indicates to which extent the EU27 share in GVCI income for a European GVC matches the EU27 share 
in world GDP. The stronger this match, the higher the degree of global fragmentation. 
IPFRF is based on comparisons of the shares of the country-of-completion and the rest of the EU27, in 
total EU27 GVCI and GDP. Offshoring stages of production in the global value chain for German transport 
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equipment to other EU27 countries (irrespective of the particular EU27-countries to which relocation takes 
place) is measured as an increase in regional fragmentation. 
 
 ***INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
)* measures the fragmentation within the “Other EU27”region (a situation in which a limited number 
of countries generate virtually all GVCI accruing to “Other EU27” results in a high  )*), while )+ 
refers to fragmentation across countries within “Other” (the non-EU27 countries in the database, including 
the Rest of the World). 
 
 




The computation of Global Value Chain Income (GVCI) according to Equation (1) requires the availability of 
a global input-output table. Such data have become available only very recently. By linking GTAP input-
output tables to bilateral trade data from the same source (see Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008), Johnson 
and Noguera (2012a) and Koopman et al. (2013) constructed global input-output tables.10 These tables are 
not publicly available, however, and only cover one year. We use the newly constructed World Input-
Output Database, which has the main advantage that it provides time-series of global input-output tables, 
covering 35 industries in 40 countries in the world plus a region called “Rest of the World”, for the period 
1995-2009.11 For the purpose of this paper we have extended the data to 2011 using methodologies that 
were also applied for 1995-2009, but based on more limited and often preliminary data. In addition, we 
revised the 2008 and 2009 tables to include recent revisions in the export and import statistics of India and 
in particular China.  
Basically, a world input-output table (WIOT) is a combination of national input-output tables in which 
the use of products is broken down according to country-industry of origin. This is illustrated by the 
schematic outline for a WIOT in Figure 3. It illustrates a simplified WIOT with N countries, which together 
constitute the world economy. The rows in the WIOT indicate the value of deliveries of output from a 
particular industry in a country. This can be used for intermediate use (in the blocks labeled Z) or final use 
(in the blocks labeled F), either domestically or abroad. A fundamental accounting identity is that total use 
of output in a row equals total output of the same industry as indicated by the sum of inputs in the 
respective column in the left-hand part of the tables. The columns convey information on the technology of 
production as they indicate the amounts of intermediate inputs needed for production. Intermediate inputs 
are either sourced from domestic industries or imported. The residual between total output and total 
                                                          
9
 For a more elaborate discussion of construction methods, practical implementation and detailed sources underlying 
the WIOD database, see Timmer (ed.) (2012).    
10
 A notable early effort to construct international input-output tables (for the EU 1965-1985) led to a series of 
publications in the regional science literature. See e.g., Van der Linden and Oosterhaven (1995), Dietzenbacher and 
Van der Linden (1997), Oosterhaven and Hoen (1998) and Dietzenbacher et al. (2000). Furthermore, the Japanese 
government agency IDE-JETRO has a long tradition of constructing international input-output tables for East Asia (see 
e.g., Meng et al., 2013).  
11
 All WIOTs and underlying data sources are publicly available for free at www.wiod.org. 
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intermediate inputs is value added (w), which measures the direct contribution of domestic factors to 
output. 
 
***INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE***
 
 
WIOTs have been specifically constructed to allow for both cross-country and intertemporal comparisons, 
by benchmarking them to the concepts and statistics from the National Accounts, and a common industrial 
classification (ISIC rev. 3). All national tables have been harmonized, removing idiosyncrasies regarding price 
concepts, treatment of financial services, and negatives in the intermediate blocks. Typically, input-output 
tables are only available for a limited set of years (e.g. every five years) and once released by the national 
statistical institute revisions are rare. To remedy problems related to the introduction of new statistical 
methodologies and accounting rules, which usually do not lead to revised input-output tables, WIOTs have 
been constructed on the basis of National Accounts time series and benchmark Supply and Use tables.12 
This treatment ensures consistency of the tables, both in the intertemporal and intercountry dimensions. 
A second characteristic of the WIOTs is that the supply of products is broken down by country and 
industry of origin. This type of information is not available in any input-output table published by national 
statistical offices. To allow for differences in the intensity of use of imported products (relative to 
domestically produced products) across intermediate use and final use, national SUTs in the WIOD were 
linked through a classification of bilateral import flows by three end-use categories using detailed 
international trade statistics (UN COMTRADE at the 6-digit product level). WIOTs also cover trade in services 
collected from various international data sources (including OECD, Eurostat, IMF and WTO), checked for 
consistency and integrated into a bilateral service trade database. 
The WIOTs have been expressed in current US$ using official exchange rates from the IMF to convert 
tables in national currencies. All tables are expressed in basic prices, which is a price concept that excludes 
net taxes and trade and transportation margins.13 This fits our purpose to measure the distribution of value 
added in the production process of a good. 
 
 
4. TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION FRAGMENTATION  
 
This results section is divided into three parts. First, we examine trends in international production 
fragmentation of European GVCs. We show that international fragmentation has been increasing for the 
vast majority of GVCs, irrespective of the country-of-completion and of the nature of the final goods 
produced in the GVC. Second, we use the decomposability of the IPF to study to what extent increased 
production fragmentation of GVCs in the European Union is due to “regional fragmentation” as other EU 
countries capture growing shares of GVC Income, or to “global fragmentation” as more value is added 
outside the EU. We find that both types of fragmentation contributed to the tendency towards more 
fragmented GVCs, but conclude that global fragmentation has caused the largest effects. Third, we 
                                                          
12
 Supply and use tables have been used if available, rather than input-output tables. Input-output tables are of the 
industry-by-industry or product-by-product type. Supply and use tables are of a product-by-industry nature and hence 
provide a better linking with product-based trade data and industry-based value added data. 
13
 Trade and transport margins have been allocated as output to the respective trade and transport industries. 
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investigate whether the global financial crisis in 2008 only led to temporary decreases in international 
production fragmentation or had effects in the longer run as well.  
 
Increasing fragmentation over time 
Figure 4 shows a scatter plot of IPF indexes for manufacturing global value chains in 1995 and 2008 based 
on Equation (2). All industries and countries-of-completion in the European Union have been included, so 
we have 14 x 27 = 378 GVCs.14 If production processes would have remained equally fragmented over the 
period, the observations would have clustered around the 45-degree line. The vast majority of observations 
are below the 45-degree line, however, reflecting an increase in fragmentation. A simple OLS regression 
through the origin yields an estimated slope coefficient of only 0.78.15 On average global value chains 
became almost 22% more fragmented over the 13-year period considered. 
 
***INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
In section 2 we argued that the Feenstra and Hanson indices do not allow for useful comparisons of 
fragmentation levels across countries of different sizes. This is illustrated in Table 2, which presents 
country-specific weighted means over manufacturing GVCs for the narrow and broad measures of 
offshoring (Feenstra and Hanson, 1999), and the IPF index, for 2008. The countries have been grouped by 
region, and sorted on GDP in current US dollars at market exchange rates in 2008. As explained in section 2, 
the broad measure of offshoring is the share of imported intermediate inputs in total intermediate inputs. 16 
The narrow measure of offshoring is the share of imported intermediate inputs in intermediate inputs from 
the same industry. Note that a lower value for the FH index indicates less fragmentation. A lower value of 
the IPF index, however, corresponds to a higher degree of fragmentation. 
The last row of Table 2 clearly shows that large economies tend to have low values for the indicators 
proposed before. Correlation coefficients between GDP levels on the one hand and the broad and narrow 
measures of offshoring on the other are sizable, at -0.53 and -0.43, respectively. For our IPF index, the 
correlation coefficient is much lower (-0.14 and insignificant at conventional levels). These results provide 
evidence that IPF indexes can indeed be meaningfully compared across countries-of-completion. 
 
***INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
Table 2 also shows that the IPF index and the offshoring measures tend to indicate similar differences in 
fragmentation across countries when GDPs are comparable.17 Comparing pairs of EU15-countries of about 
the same size, like Belgium-Sweden or Finland-Ireland, reveals that low levels of international production 
fragmentation according to the IPF index are also reflected in low values for the FH measures. As the 
                                                          
14
 Two observations have been dropped in the graph, since we did not observe final output in 1995 for leather 
manufacturing and petroleum manufacturing in Luxembourg. 
15
 A Wald test rejects the hypothesis that the slope coefficient is equal to one at the 1 percent significance level. 
16
 Feenstra and Hanson (1999) excluded energy inputs from total intermediate inputs. We included these. Prices of 
energy inputs are typically much more volatile compared to prices of other inputs. Since we include energy inputs in 
the IPF-index (because natural resources play an important role in many global value chains), a useful comparison 
requires the inclusion of energy inputs in the narrow and broad measures of offshoring as well. 
17
 The correlation coefficients between the IPF index on the one hand and the narrow and broad measure of 
offshoring, are -0.43, and -0.27 respectively. 
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discussion of the indicators in Section 2 suggested already, the correlation between the indicators is not 
perfect, however, if only because they measure different aspects of the roles that countries play in 
networks of global value chains. Portugal and Ireland, for example, have comparable offshoring values, 
while the IPF index shows that Irish global value chains are considerably more fragmented than Portuguese 
ones. 
Our first results focus on industries-of-completion, averaging over countries-of-completion. To what 
extent are GVCs of say final chemical products less fragmented than GVCs producing transportation 
equipment? Or, have fragmentation tendencies been much more pronounced for some products than for 
others? Answers to such questions provide information with regard to the extent to which the stories of 
fragmentation from case studies as discussed in the introduction can be generalized to manufacturing 
products in general. The IPF indices of products are shown in Table 3. Products are grouped into the main 
industry of final production. The average IPF index for global value chains by manufacturing product group 
are given for 1995 and 2008. They have been averaged over countries-of-completion and weighted by the 
value of final output. 
 
***INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
Table 3 clearly shows that the production processes related to all goods became more fragmented over 
time. But we also observe substantial differences in international production fragmentation of GVCs across 
products, which appear to be quite persistent over time. The production processes of transport equipment 
and electrical and electronic products have been most fragmented. These are also important industries in 
terms of their final output value. The production processes of non-metallic minerals and of food products 
are at the opposite end of the spectrum. These differences in international production fragmentation across 
manufacturing goods are most likely related to trade barriers and transport costs. Upstream intermediate 
inputs (like many natural resources) often cross multiple borders, which implies that tariffs and transport 
costs are incurred repeatedly (Yi, 2003). Non-tariff barriers on food products are known to be relatively high 
(Lee and Swagel, 1997) and so are transport costs. Similarly, transportation costs for products like stone and 
cement are high, given their low value-to-weight ratios. These ratios are considerably more favorable for 
electronic parts and components, as a consequence of which GVCs for electrical and electronics products 
are more internationally fragmented than those for food products and non-metallic mineral. Such 
differences were highlighted in Hummels (2007) who found that transportation costs dropped faster for 
products that tend to be shipped by air. Besides cost differences, differences in the importance of 
timeliness of delivery can also have an impact on the choice for a domestic supplier or a supplier abroad. In 
a study of car manufacturing, Sturgeon et al. (2008) stress additional factors. National car manufacturing 
industries are considered to be of such an importance by national governments that protectionist policies 
focusing on high degrees of “local content” lead companies to locate assembly facilities near their end-
markets. In addition, the car manufacturers often urge their main first-tier suppliers of parts and 
components to move to those locations as well, while second-tier suppliers often tend to benefit from 
economies-of-scale by producing in only a few locations.  
Are there also differences in GVC fragmentation across countries-of-completion? This can be 
investigated by averaging across industries in each country. Table 4 provides insights into differences in 
degrees of international production fragmentation across countries in 1995 and 2008, and changes over 
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this period. The country-level IPF indexes have been constructed as averages of IPF indexes of 
manufacturing GVCs, weighted with the values of final output of these GVCs. 
 
***INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
The increase in international fragmentation that was evident in Figure 4’s scatter plot is also apparent from 
the columns in Table 4, which presents the changes in international production fragmentation over time. 
GVCs of all countries became more fragmented. The regional figures in the last row do not only hide a lot of 
heterogeneity with respect to levels, but also regarding changes over time. The biggest changes within the 
EU are observed for Eastern European global value chains, with the largest increase in fragmentation in 
Polish value chains. For the large European Union countries, we find that British value chains processes 
were more fragmented in 1995 than their German and French counterparts. Thereafter, however, 
production fragmentation increased at a fast pace in Germany and France. As a result, production in 2008 
was more fragmented in German and French GVCs than in GVCs with the United Kingdom as the country-of-
completion. Small EU15-countries with relatively unfragmented GVCs in 1995 (such as Austria and 
Denmark) experienced relatively fast reductions in their IPF indexes, although their GVCs were still less 
internationally fragmented in 2008 than those of Belgium and the Netherlands. These are specific cases of a 
more general pattern: on average, GVCs of countries-of-completion with little fragmentation in 1995 
experienced stronger increases in fragmentation in 1995-2008 than those that were initially very 
fragmented already. This finding of convergence of fragmentation levels is supported in regression analysis 
where we find a significant negative effect of initial levels on changes in the IPF index.18 
The increases in fragmentation by country-of-completion as reported in Table 4 could be caused by two 
effects. GVCs for many industries-of-completion can have become more fragmented, and final output of 
fragmented GVCs can have grown faster than final output of less fragmented GVCs (a product-mix effect) 
Shift-share analysis suggests that changes in fragmentation are mainly driven by increased fragmentation 
within GVCs. On average, about 90 percent of changes in country-level IPF indexes is explained by this. Only 
for some Eastern European countries, such as the Czech Republic and Hungary, we find that changes in the 
product mixes account for a considerably larger share of changes in the IPF index (32 and 28 percent 
respectively). 
  
                                                          
18
 We estimated an OLS regression for manufacturing industries, clustering standard errors by country and weighing 
observations by final output. The effect of initial levels on changes in the IPF index is significant at the 1 percent level. 
Regression results are available upon request. 
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Global versus regional fragmentation in European value chains 
In his study on bilateral vs. multilateral free trade agreements, Baldwin (2006b) made a distinction between 
international economic integration within regions and global economic integration. The relative magnitudes 
of international (gross) trade flows within regions (like the EU or NAFTA) are still much larger than those of 
trade flows between regions. Given integration of markets within the EU and the simultaneous fast growth 
of emerging economies outside Europe, it is interesting to investigate what shares in the trends toward 
fragmentation of European GVCs as quantified above can be attributed to global fragmentation and 
regional fragmentation, respectively. 
Before turning to the decomposition results based on the IPF index, we first present some statistics 
based on Feenstra and Hanson’s broad measure of offshoring, as this provides an intuitive background to 
our decomposition. Table 5 shows this measure for each EU country (column (1)) and also presents splits 
into the percentage of imported intermediates from EU countries and the percentage imported from non-
EU countries, for 1995 and 2008. The rightmost columns in the table indicate that shares of imported 
intermediate inputs from EU27 countries have generally grown faster than corresponding shares from 
outside the EU27. This pattern is most pronounced for the EU12 countries. In this set of countries, the 
Czech Republic and Estonia appear to be the only countries for which the share of non-EU27 intermediate 
inputs increased more than the share from EU27 countries. An analysis based on the FH broad measure of 
offshoring thus suggests that regional fragmentation has been the main driver of international production 
fragmentation. 
 
***INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
In Section 3, we argued that one of the main disadvantages of the FH measures of offshoring in measuring 
production fragmentation relates to the neglect of trade in intermediate inputs in upstream industries. The 
results in columns (2) and (5) in Table 5 are computed on the basis of the intermediate inputs imported 
from within the EU27, but is not sensitive to the degree to which the production of these products required 
intermediate inputs from outside the EU27. This so-called double counting problem was highlighted by 
Johnson and Noguera (2012a) and Koopman et al. (2013). To get some preliminary insights into the 
potential consequences of this phenomenon, we computed GVCI in UK manufacturing value chains for 
“Other EU27” and for “Non EU27”, and considered the growth in these shares over 1995-2008. The GVCI 
share of “Other EU27” remained stable at 12%, while the GVCI share of “Non EU27” grew from 10% to 14%. 
This is due to the increased non-EU 27 content of EU27 exports to the UK, which is not picked up by the FH 
indices in Table 5. Similar observations apply to other countries and stress the need to correct for the 
double counting of intermediates. 
To quantify the respective contributions of global fragmentation and regional fragmentation of 
European value chains more systematically, we decompose the IPF indexes for 1995 and 2008 along the 
lines sketched in Figure 2, using Equations (A2.2). We focus our analysis on the changes over this period. In 
Table 6, the first column shows the changes in the average IPF index by country-of-completion. The second 
column reports the contribution from changes in global fragmentation (&,. The third column 
documents the contribution of regional fragmentation in the EU27 ((&). Columns (4) and (5) show 
changes in fragmentation within “Other EU27” ()*) and “Other” ()+). These terms capture the 
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fragmentation due to changes in the GVCI-shares for each of the other EU27 countries in “Other EU27”’s 
GVCI and for each of the non-EU27 countries in “Other”’s GVCI, respectively. 
 
 ***INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE***  
 
The bottom rows in Table 6 show weighted averages for GVCs with countries in the EU15 and EU12 as 
countries-of-completion, respectively. For both sets of GVCs, we find that changes in global fragmentation 
have been the dominant driver of the overall change in the IPF-indexes. In EU15 GVCs, global fragmentation 
accounted for almost 90% of the total change in fragmentation, while regional fragmentation contributed 
19%. The negative effects of the two “within”-terms are small (9%) for these value chains. For the EU12 
value chains, almost half of the increase in overall production fragmentation was contributed by global 
fragmentation, while regional fragmentation accounted for slightly more than 15%. GVCs of sizable 
countries like the Czech Republic and Poland appear to rely increasingly on upstream activities outside 
Europe. These findings complement Marin’s (2006) results about increasing integration of Eastern European 
countries in European value chains. The positive contribution of regional fragmentation in EU15 GVCs is 
partly a reflection of EU12 countries capturing increasing shares of GVCI in these chains, which is a 
confirmation of Marin’s findings based on EU12 exports of intermediate inputs to Austrian and German 
firms. The dominance of increasing global fragmentation for the Czech Republic and Poland reflect that 
their value chains increasingly rely on imports of (low-tech) materials and parts from non-EU27, rather than 
on activities in the EU15. Our results thus indicate that integration of EU12 countries into the European 
economy is not a symmetric process. A very substantial part of the fast rates of increase in international 
production fragmentation of EU12 GVCs is accounted for by changes in the extent to which contributions of 
individual non-EU27 countries have been in proportion to their GDP-levels (column (5)). This is a 
consequence of the fact that a number of EU12 countries were still highly dependent on Russia in the early 
years of the 1995-2008 period. Over time, other non-EU27 countries (like China, Japan and the US) also 
started to supply intermediate inputs to EU12 value chains (often as second- or third-tier suppliers, via 
EU15 first-tier suppliers), which led to a more even distribution of GVC income over non-EU27 countries.19 
We also investigated whether the relative importance of changes in global fragmentation and regional 
fragmentation varied across GVCs for the product groups listed in Table 3. The (undocumented) results 
show that increases in global fragmentation dominated for all product groups. For textile products and 
electronics, changes in global fragmentation completely drove the overall increase in fragmentation, while 
this was less evident for food products and leather products.    
 
Production fragmentation after the crisis 
Is the long-run trend towards fragmentation in European GVCs a particular historical period that ended with 
the financial crisis, or has it continued? The immediate consequences of the crisis were studied in a global 
input-output framework by Bems et al. (2011), who concluded that international trade declined 
considerably more than world GDP when the crisis started. This was explained by demand uncertainty 
leading firms to use existing stocks of materials and components, instead of ordering usual amounts of 
                                                          
19
 The share of Russian GVC income in Hungarian global value chains, for example, decreased from 5.0% in 1995 to 
3.7% in 2008. Among the six biggest EU12 economies, Poland is the only one for which the Russian income share in its 
GVCs increased considerably (from 2.3 to 4.2 per cent).    
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intermediate inputs. It might also indicate a more structural break in the process of international 
fragmentation, however, as firms experienced the vulnerability of long production chains. Other factors like 
increasing transport costs (as fuel prices continue rising) and an upward drift in Chinese wages might be 
additional drivers towards a long-term decline in fragmentation. To investigate this, we have updated the 
WIOD to 2011 using recent data on international trade and (mostly preliminary) data on gross output and 
value added by industry.  We obtain insights into what happened in the first three years after the start of 
the crisis by regressing our time-series of IPF indexes for all EU27 manufacturing GVCs by OLS on country-
of-completion, industry-of-completion and year dummies. The inclusion of the first two sets of dummies 
allows us to isolate year-specific effects in the variation in IPF indexes. These effects give us insights into 
long-run trends, but also into the effects of the crisis. The sample consists of 6,351 observations, which 
have been weighted by the GVCs’ values of final output. Following Feenstra and Hanson (1999), the 
regressions are based on IPFs in which value added generated in mining activities has been excluded from 
both GVCI and GDP, because prices of energy inputs are typically unstable and lead to volatile value shares. 
The coefficients on the year dummies will indicate possible trends in the process of international 
fragmentation. 
 
***INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
Figure 5 shows the estimated coefficients for the year dummies and the associated 95 percent confidence 
intervals. The dummy for 1995 has been omitted, so all point estimates have to be viewed as relative to 
1995. The figure clearly reflects the across-the-board increase in international fragmentation that was 
discovered throughout the empirical part of this study. The year dummies were found to be statistically 
larger than 0 at a 5% level of significance from 1997 onwards. The point estimates show a decreasing trend 
in the IPFs (reflecting increasing fragmentation) until the onset of the crisis. Splitting the sample into 
subsamples related to specific final products (like in Table 3), we found this tendency for all product groups. 
Nevertheless, we also observed differences, since the value chains for transport equipment got increasingly 
fragmented in the second part of the 1990s already. Fragmentation of European GVCs for electronics 
products, on the other hand, did not start to get increasingly fragmented until 2003. 
The effects of the onset of the financial crisis in 2008 are clearly visible. The IPFs show an upward jump 
between 2008 and 2009. This appears to have been a short-run effect, though. Fragmentation rebounded 
almost equally fast between 2009 and 2010 and a Wald test on the equality of the year dummies for 2008 
and 2011 reveals that the IPFs in 2011 were already lower than those in 2008, which is proof that the 
tendency towards more fragmentation seems to have set in again.20 This result is found for virtually all 
product groups. We should stress that these results only convey information about the fragmentation 
effects of the crisis in the period immediately following the start of the crisis. It remains to be seen whether 
the prolongation of the crisis through 2012 might have more structural effects, also for shares in GVC 
income earned in non-EU27 countries. Our present data do not allow us to examine to what extent crisis-
induced protectionist government policies and “re-shoring” decisions by multinational companies as 
debated in the popular press (see The Economist, 2013) lead to changes that can also be observed in our 
IPF index and related indicators. 
 
                                                          
20




5. Concluding remarks 
 
Driven by rapid advances in information and communication technology and the opening up of China and 
Eastern Europe in the 1990s, companies increasingly moved parts of their production activities to benefit 
from location advantages of other countries. This paper provides a new index that quantifies the speed and 
extent of this process of international production fragmentation, called the IPF index. Put loosely, it 
measures the distribution of value added generated in the production of a final good across countries and 
regions. It is a variant of Theil’s Mean Log deviation index which is rooted in entropy theory. In the empirical 
application we show how the IPF index can be computed on the basis of world input-output tables as 
contained in the recent World Input-Output Database (WIOD). 
The empirical analysis shows that the IPF index is not sensitive to the size of countries, unlike related 
measures such as Feenstra-Hanson’s indicator of offshoring. This implies that levels of international 
production fragmentation can be compared across countries. We find a strong tendency towards increased 
fragmentation for most production processes, irrespective of the country-of-completion or the final product 
generated by a GVC. Global value chains for electrical and electronic products are most fragmented, 
followed by those for transportation equipment. We find that fragmentation of EU15 GVCs is mainly due to 
a shift in the value added in chains from the EU15 countries to non-European countries. Finally, we find that 
the upward trend in international fragmentation before the onset of the financial crisis in 2008 continued 
after a strong once-off reduction between 2008 and 2009. We did not find evidence of a long-run structural 
effect on production fragmentation. It should be stressed, though, that the crisis was not over by 2011 and 
that protectionist policies induced by the crisis might have effects that will only be visible in the longer run. 
We believe that our new index for international production fragmentation provides insights that were 
not available using existing measures related to economic globalization. The quality of future empirical 
research based on the IPF index will obviously depend on the quality of the available underlying data. We 
are confident that the main trends depicted in this paper reflect actual tendencies. Nevertheless, future 
research would benefit from further improvements in the global input-output tables required for the 
computation of global value chain income shares and the IPF index. More disaggregated industry data 
would improve the quality of the results as it better represents heterogeneity in production processes. It 
would also be very helpful if the implicit assumption that exporting firms and non-exporting firms use the 
same shares of inputs could be relaxed. The recent Trade in Value Added initiative by the OECD and the 
WTO (OECD and WTO, 2013) has ambitions into these directions. This initiative also aims at constructing 
global input-output tables containing more countries than the World Input-Output Database. Such tables 
would allow for deeper analyses of the roles of other Asian countries, such as Malaysia, Thailand and 
Vietnam, in global production systems.  
At the same time, other directions of research can be explored. The World Input-Output Database does 
not only contain information on total value added generated in country-industries, but also provides 
information about the value added and income captured by owners of capital and labor of various skill 
categories. This type of information has extensively been used in Timmer et al. (2012, 2013) to study the 
competitiveness of European countries and to document stylized facts about the distributional 
consequences of the emergence of global value chains. It can also be used to answer questions like “Are 
low-skilled stages of production processes becoming much more internationally fragmented than high-
skilled stages?” Observations such as Sinn’s (2006) that Germany is becoming a country that only designs, 
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markets and sells manufacturing products, activities that are generally thought to be high-skilled , could be 
tested empirically. Another dimension along which more insights can be gained is the increase of regional 
detail at the subnational level. Cherubini and Los (2013) and Dietzenbacher et al. (2013a) have pioneered 
regional disaggregation of the Italian and Brazilian parts of WIOD’s world input-output tables. This allows 
them to study to what extent regional economies benefit from participation in national and global value 
chains, offering macro-economic perspectives on the case study-based evidence that has been amassed, 
such as in Humphrey and Schmitz (2002). This would improve our understanding of the drivers of regional 
development in a world characterized by global value chains. 
Finally, future research might focus on the role of potential determinants of international production 
fragmentation. Our analysis showed that the degree of fragmentation varies across product groups, but we 
could only speculated about the causes of these differences. For example, Johnson and Noguera (2012b) 
found that participation in bilateral free-trade agreements positively affects the vertical specialization of 
countries in trade. A similar analysis for global value chains could lead to complementary insights by linking 
to what is probably the most important question to be pursued: “How can countries benefit from the 
increased international fragmentation of production processes?” The recent study by Baldwin and Evenett 
(2012) gives an extensive overview of the issues at stake for the UK. Policy insights like theirs combined 
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Appendix 1: Derivation of Global Value Chain Incomes 
 
To compute the GVCI income related to the value chain with industry j in country i as the country-of-
completion as generated in each of the countries, a global input-output table as depicted in Figure 3 is 
taken as the point of departure. The number of industries in each of the countries is S, the number of 
countries is N. The number of final demand categories per country is indicated by C. The (SNxSN)-matrix A 
20 
 
and the (SN)-vector v are obtained as - 
 ./0,1% and ′ 
 3′/0,1%, respectively.21 A gives the 
intermediate inputs required per unit of gross output, while v represents the value added generated per 
unit of gross output. As a first step in computing the income generated in the GVCs for (i,j)’s final products, 
we derive the payments for capital and labor in the country-industry-of-completion. This equals gtier0 = e, 
in which e is an (CN)-summation vector and  stands for a final demand matrix (of dimensions (SNxCN)) in 
which only the row representing final demand for country-industry (i,j) have their actual value and all other 
final demand is set to 0. This implies that e is an (SN)-vector with a single positive element, which is 
obtained by adding domestic and foreign final demand for (i,j)’s products. The elements of gtier0 (which is an 
(SN)-vector with GVC income in the final production stage) equal zero for all industries other than (i,j). As 
the stylized example in Figure 1 shows, the production of these final product deliveries does not only 
require labor and capital inputs, but also intermediate inputs from (domestic and foreign) first tier 
suppliers. The gross outputs of these industries attributable to final demand for country 3’s products equals 
Ae and the global value chain income in first-tier suppliers can be expressed as gtier1 = Ae. The 
intermediate products (Ae) delivered by first-tier suppliers in their turn require intermediate inputs, from 
second-tier suppliers. These output levels equal A(Ae) and the associated second-tier global value chain 
income levels are gtier2 = A(Ae). Continuing this line of reasoning for higher-tier suppliers and adding over 
tiers, we can write for the vector of total GVC income levels (see Miller and Blair, 2009, for the mild 
conditions under which the summation converges): 
 
g = gtier0 + gtier1+gtier2 +gtier3 + … = (I +A + A2 + A3 + …)(e) = (I -A)-1(e)   (A1.1) 
 
Equation (A1.1) is identical to Equation (1) in the main text. The matrix (I -A)-1 is the well-known Leontief 
inverse. g contains the value added (income) in each of the industries in each of the countries that can be 
attributed to the global value chains for country-industry (i,j)’s final products. In order to obtain Global 
Value Chain Income by country, the elements of the (SN)-vector g that correspond to industries in a country 
are simply added. 
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. in Figure 3. x should be interpreted in the same vein. 
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Appendix 2: Decomposition of IPF index 
 
To outline our IPF index decomposition approach as depicted in Figure 2 in mathematical terms, we follow 
Akita (2003) in adopting a notation in which GVCI related to industry-of-completion i in country j and GDP 
both have three sub-indexes. We first split the world into super-regions, indicated by l = 1, …, L (L=2). These 
super-regions are “EU27” and “Other”. The number of regions (indicated by m = 1, …, Ml) contained in these 
super-regions varies. The super-region “EU27” contains two regions: “home” (the country-of-completion 
itself) and “Other EU27”. The super-region “Other” contains just a single region (“Other”). Finally, each of 
the 41 countries that potentially add value belongs to a single region. As before, the countries are indicated 
by n (n = 1, …, Nm, with Nm the number of countries in region m). Equation (2) can now be expanded into: 
 
	 
 ∑ ∑ ∑  4 ln  4 ⁄4  !
"4#$%56$%78$%          (A2.1) 
 




 &	 ' (&	 ' )*	 ' )+	        (3) 
 
The first term on the right hand side (&	 ) stands for the degree of global fragmentation of the value 
chain with (i,j) as the country-industry-of-completion. We define global fragmentation as the fragmentation 
between the two super-regions. It is defined as  
 
      &	 
 ∑  78$% 9:  ⁄  !       (A2.2a) 
with   ;<8 
 ∑ ∑ ;<86#"4#$%56$%  and ;=>8	 
 ∑ ∑ ;=>86#	"4#$%56$% ) 
 
The second term ((&	 ) indicates the level of regional fragmentation of value chain (i,j) between the 
country-of-completion and the rest of the EU27 considered as a single region: 
    
(&	 
  ?∑ ?4? 5?6$% 9: @?4 ?⁄?4 ? A      (A2.2b) 
with  (;<%6 
 ∑ ;<%6#"4#$% ; ;=>%6	 
 ∑ ;=>%6#	"4#$% ) 
 
The last two terms in Equation (3) relate to the distribution of GVCI over countries within regions. These so-
called “within”-terms are computed as 
 
)*	 
 ?B? ∑ ?B?B "?#$% 9: @ ?B ?B⁄?B ?B A  and    (A2.2c) 
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B?B "B#$% 9: @ 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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 A     (A2.2d) 




Source: Authors’ calculations on World Input-Output Database (revised April 2012 release). 
Note: GVCI is global value chain income expressed in US dollars at market exchange 
rates. GDP is world gross domestic product expressed in US dollars at market exchange 
rates.  
  
GVCI GDP GVCI GDP
GER 0.789 0.080 0.660 0.049
Other-EU27 0.132 0.210 0.186 0.187
non-EU27 0.079 0.711 0.154 0.764





Table 2. Comparison of the IPF index to alternative measures, 2008 







EU 15           
Germany 3,272,236 
 
0.46 0.49 1.32 
France 2,574,694 
 
0.41 0.44 1.45 
United Kingdom 2,451,686 
 
0.51 0.61 1.46 
Italy 2,072,559 
 
0.28 0.34 1.56 
Spain 1,464,933 
 
0.30 0.36 1.54 
the Netherlands 778,522 
 
0.66 0.75 1.17 
Belgium 453,502 
 
0.77 0.84 1.10 
Sweden 431,143 
 
0.50 0.59 1.38 
Austria 377,310 
 
0.62 0.71 1.52 
Greece 308,371 
 
0.49 0.49 1.78 
Denmark 293,005 
 
0.65 0.64 1.47 
Finland 237,540 
 
0.35 0.42 1.51 
Ireland 235,018 
 
0.51 0.53 1.05 
Portugal 219,403 
 
0.47 0.54 1.68 
Luxembourg 52,737 
 
0.86 0.92 1.40 
 
EU 12 
     Poland 469,601 
 
0.45 0.51 1.64 
Czech Republic 195,961 
 
0.54 0.59 1.36 
Romania 183,465 
 
0.49 0.44 1.98 
Hungary 134,007 
 
0.72 0.84 1.18 
Slovakia 86,138 
 
0.71 0.78 1.37 
Slovenia 48,156 
 
0.68 0.74 1.37 
Lithuania 42,587 
 
0.61 0.62 2.11 
Bulgaria 40,790 
 
0.59 0.56 1.56 
Latvia 30,342 
 
0.66 0.56 1.92 
Cyprus 22,483 
 
0.59 0.53 1.51 
Estonia 21,047 
 
0.73 0.76 1.52 
Malta 7,613 
 
0.85 0.88 1.30 
      
correlation with GDP     -0.53 -0.43 -0.14 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database (revised April 2012 release).   
Notes: GDP in millions of current US dollars at market exchange rates. All indicators represent appropriately weighted 








code 1995 2008 Change 1995-2008 Final output 
Transport products 34,35 1.51 1.14 0.37 675,330 
Electronic products 30-33 1.47 1.20 0.27 361,055 
Basic and fabricated metals 27,28 1.74 1.30 0.44 162,697 
Chemical products 24 1.74 1.30 0.44 321,191 
Manufacturing n.e.c. 36 1.76 1.39 0.37 502,591 
Rubber and plastics 25 1.75 1.39 0.36 59,048 
Petroleum products 23 1.81 1.50 0.30 224,278 
Machinery n.e.c. 29 1.92 1.55 0.37 192,184 
Textile products 17,18 1.89 1.61 0.28 160,962 
Leather products 19 1.97 1.67 0.30 46,971 
Paper and printing products 21,22 2.01 1.70 0.32 160,827 
Wood products 20 2.08 1.70 0.38 26,577 
Food products 15,16 2.07 1.71 0.36 791,960 
Other non-metallic minerals 26 2.16 1.72 0.45 41,442 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the World Input-Output Database (revised April 2012 release).  
Notes: Average IPF for the global value chains of manufacturing products for European countries, weighted by the 
values of final output across countries. Products ordered by degree of international fragmentation in 2008. Last 




Table 4. International Production Fragmentation by country, 1995 and 2008 and change over  
1995-2008 
Country 1995 2008 
Change 
1995-




Austria 2.07 1.52 0.54 Bulgaria 2.36 1.56 0.79 
Belgium 1.34 1.10 0.24 Cyprus 1.66 1.51 0.15 
Denmark 2.07 1.47 0.60 Czech Republic 2.01 1.36 0.65 
Finland 1.84 1.51 0.34 Estonia 2.06 1.52 0.54 
France 1.78 1.44 0.33 Hungary 1.90 1.18 0.71 
Germany 1.77 1.32 0.45 Latvia 2.49 1.92 0.56 
Greece 2.30 1.78 0.52 Lithuania 2.21 2.11 0.11 
Ireland 1.35 1.05 0.30 Malta 1.54 1.30 0.24 
Italy 1.91 1.56 0.34 Poland 2.54 1.64 0.90 
Luxembourg 1.70 1.40 0.30 Romania 2.57 1.98 0.59 
Netherlands 1.41 1.17 0.24 Slovakia 2.23 1.36 0.86 
Portugal 1.97 1.68 0.29 Slovenia 1.89 1.37 0.51 
Spain 2.00 1.54 0.45     
Sweden 1.75 1.38 0.36     
United Kingdom 1.68 1.46 0.22     
        
EU 15 1.78 1.42 0.37 EU 12 2.27 1.55 0.72 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the World Input-Output Database (revised April 2012 release);  
Notes: Average IPF for manufacturing global value chains, weighted by the value of final output. IPF indexes by 













EU non EU 











(1) = (2) + (3) 
 
(4) = (5) + (6) 
EU 15 
       Austria 0.44 0.27 0.17 
 
0.18 0.09 0.08 
Belgium 0.67 0.39 0.27 
 
0.10 0.01 0.09 
Denmark 0.55 0.33 0.23 
 
0.10 0.04 0.06 
Finland 0.28 0.23 0.05 
 
0.07 0.06 0.00 
France 0.33 0.24 0.09 
 
0.08 0.05 0.02 
Germany 0.30 0.14 0.16 
 
0.17 0.09 0.08 
Greece 0.34 0.21 0.13 
 
0.15 0.07 0.09 
Ireland 0.68 0.59 0.10 
 
-0.18 -0.12 -0.05 
Italy 0.24 0.16 0.07 
 
0.04 0.04 0.00 
Luxembourg 0.88 0.67 0.21 
 
-0.02 -0.05 0.03 
the Netherlands 0.61 0.32 0.29  0.05 -0.01 0.07 
Portugal 0.33 0.18 0.14 
 
0.14 0.12 0.02 
Spain 0.23 0.14 0.09 
 
0.07 0.03 0.03 
Sweden 0.40 0.23 0.16 
 
0.10 0.08 0.03 
United Kingdom 0.36 0.16 0.20 
 
0.15 0.10 0.05 
        EU 12 
       Bulgaria 0.35 0.24 0.11 
 
0.24 0.13 0.11 
Cyprus 0.60 0.49 0.11 
 
-0.01 0.01 -0.01 
Czech Republic 0.36 0.19 0.17 
 
0.18 0.05 0.13 
Estonia 0.64 0.40 0.24 
 
0.09 0.02 0.07 
Hungary 0.35 0.23 0.11 
 
0.37 0.35 0.02 
Latvia 0.53 0.38 0.15 
 
0.13 0.08 0.05 
Lithuania 0.61 0.32 0.29 
 
0.00 0.00 -0.01 
Malta 0.79 0.63 0.16 
 
0.06 0.09 -0.02 
Poland 0.24 0.14 0.10 
 
0.21 0.11 0.10 
Romania 0.27 0.20 0.06 
 
0.23 0.13 0.10 
Slovakia 0.36 0.29 0.07 
 
0.35 0.33 0.03 
Slovenia 0.53 0.35 0.17 
 
0.16 0.11 0.05 
        
Average EU 15 0.34 0.20 0.14  0.10 0.06 0.04 
Average EU 12 0.34 0.22 0.12   0.22 0.13 0.08 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the World Input-Output Database (revised April 2012 release). 
Notes: Import share is the share of imported intermediates in total intermediate use. This import share is 
split in the subsequent columns into the share from EU countries and non-EU countries. Columns might not 
sum due to rounding. 
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(1) = (2) + (3) + (4) + (5) 
EU 15 
     Austria 0.54 0.34 0.11 -0.02 0.11 
Belgium 0.24 0.31 0.04 -0.03 -0.08 
Denmark 0.60 0.37 0.08 0.01 0.14 
Finland 0.34 0.35 0.08 0.00 -0.09 
France 0.33 0.32 0.05 0.00 -0.04 
Germany 0.45 0.42 0.03 -0.01 0.01 
Greece 0.52 0.70 0.03 -0.01 -0.21 
Ireland 0.30 0.18 0.11 0.00 0.01 
Italy 0.34 0.33 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
Luxembourg 0.30 0.21 0.07 0.00 0.02 
the Netherlands 0.24 0.23 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 
Portugal 0.29 0.28 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 
Spain 0.45 0.38 0.10 -0.01 -0.02 
Sweden 0.36 0.35 0.09 -0.02 -0.05 
United Kingdom 0.22 0.18 0.05 0.00 -0.01 
      EU 12 
     Bulgaria 0.79 0.20 0.18 0.01 0.40 
Cyprus 0.15 0.09 -0.01 -0.01 0.08 
Czech Republic 0.65 0.36 0.12 0.02 0.14 
Estonia 0.54 0.21 -0.03 0.08 0.27 
Hungary 0.71 0.26 0.18 0.00 0.28 
Latvia 0.56 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.36 
Lithuania 0.11 0.08 0.03 -0.01 0.01 
Malta 0.24 0.20 -0.03 0.02 0.05 
Poland 0.90 0.62 0.18 0.00 0.11 
Romania 0.59 0.22 0.14 0.00 0.24 
Slovakia 0.86 0.41 0.16 0.08 0.22 
Slovenia 0.51 0.41 0.04 0.01 0.06 
      Average EU15 0.37 0.33 0.07 -0.01 -0.02 
Average EU12 0.55 0.26 0.09 0.02 0.18 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the World Input-Output Database 
Notes: Change in the average IPF for the global value chains of manufacturing industries weighted by final output by 
country. Decomposition of the IPF index in subsequent columns has been calculated using Equations (A2.2). Columns 


































Figure 2. Decomposition of IPF index 
 
 
Note: IPF (total fragmentation) computed according to Equation (2). IPFGF (global fragmentation), IPFRF (regional 
























Figure 3. A stylized world input-output table 
 Intermediate use 
(S columns per country) 
Final use 
(C columns per country) 
Total 
 1 … N 1 … N  
S Industries, country 1 .%% .%. .%"  %% %. %" 0% 
… ..% ... .." .%  ..  ." 0. 
S Industries, country N ."% .". ."" "% ". "" 0" 
Value added /3%,′ /3D,′ /3",′     





Figure 4. International production fragmentation indexes, 1995 and 2008 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the World Input-Output Database (revised April 2012 
release). 
Notes: Each dot represents the IPF indexes for the global value chain of a manufacturing industry in 
a particular country in 1995 and 2008. The IPF indexes have been estimated according to Equation 
(2). 376 observations, from the 27 European countries-of-completion, have been included. The 
dashed line is the 45 degree line. The solid line has been obtained by OLS regression through the 
















Figure 5. International production fragmentation before and after the 2008 financial crisis 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the World Input-Output Database (revised April 2012 
release). 
Notes: Regression of IPF index on country-of-completion dummies, industry-of-completion 
dummies and year dummies. The figure provides estimated coefficients and 95 percent confidence 
intervals of year dummies. The observations (6,351) are weighted by final output. Value added 
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